This post was originally written for an assignment under a different name.
Free speech and debate are vital to society. The ability to make truth claims of one’s own and dispute others’ enables people to together to find the truth. But some people hold views which have been widely discredited, are rooted in lies and deception, and can bring about real harm to people. I will consider this issue through the example of a Holocaust denier being invited onto a campus, and I will conclude that, given a few things, he should be allowed to speak. I will consider reasons to not permit him to speak outside of his views, and I will consider reasons to not permit to speak on account of his views through two different perspectives. I will argue that it is not appropriate to bar him for speaking on account of his views. I will briefly consider what can be done about objectionable views in an academic space.
The first reason someone might refuse platform to the speaker is that he is unfit for free debate for reasons beyond his beliefs. Free debate necessitates a space with a degree of civility, and absolute safety. The reason I say that free debate requires a degree of civility, rather than total civility, is that civility is very subjective and depends a great deal on the beliefs of the individual. Even if people are operating under the same model of civility, they may disagree about whether something is civil due to other beliefs. For example, someone could find the speaker to be uncivil solely by virtue of his beliefs. It is also possible that someone’s beliefs will directly lead her to act in a way which is considered uncivil. For example, there are people who refuse to use the singular “they” pronoun for people who identify as non-binary because they believe that perpetuating the idea of spectral gender is harmful to the fabric of society. By refusing to refer to someone the way they prefer, this could be called an incivility, but it is important to note that this is a type of incivility which stems directly and necessarily from one’s beliefs.
I do not mean to say that it is inappropriate to refuse platform to people because they are known for committing either of these types of incivilities, nor am I saying that it is morally acceptable to commit these kinds of incivilities—I will consider these cases later. I merely want to distinguish unnecessary incivility from necessary incivility. By “necessary,” in this case, I am referring to a situation in which an incivility is necessary to having, expressing, and arguing for a position. It is also possible that necessary incivilities are not actually incivilities at all, but I will not make this claim in the course of this post.
Unnecessary incivility is different. It is important to note that unnecessary incivility can stem from a person’s beliefs; it just isn’t necessary for expressing and arguing for them. For example, if someone believed that vest-wearing is harmful to society, she may be inclined to go into public and yell obscenities at anyone wearing a vest. This is obviously quite uncivil, and it stems from her beliefs, but it is not a necessary incivility because it is not necessary to her beliefs or the expression of her beliefs. Someone can also be known to be uncivil for reasons outside of the beliefs in question. Someone could just be a very rude person.
A debate marked by these kinds of incivilities is unhealthy. Debate and discourse are inherently civilized activities. As a debate becomes more characterized by shouting, harassment, and insults, it becomes less a debate, and more an altercation. To encourage good debate and healthy discourse as opposed to a possibly entertaining, but ultimately empty, charade masquerading as academics, it is reasonable for academia to prohibit people who are known for being unnecessarily uncivil from speaking under the veil of academic discussion. That does not mean that this should be enforced with no wiggle room. Not all incivilities are equally destructive to debate, nor do all of them cleanly fall into either of the two categories. It is not appropriate to use this reasoning as a form of censorship or to enforce rules in a non-evenhanded manner.
It is up to the university to determine whether a person’s unnecessary incivilities should prevent them from speaking in an academic environment. Some may choose to ignore unnecessary incivilities entirely to circumvent allowing one’s bias from influencing who is given the opportunity to speak, but I do not see a reason for this type of preventative behavior to be considered mandatory. I do think that it is likely necessary for the university to publish their standards for speakers and create a system where they are held accountable for any bias in order to communicate a respect for free speech and ensure that it is not throttled. If the speaker is known for giving turning campus speaking opportunities into trolling sessions and streams of insults rather than spend his time making real arguments for why he does not believe that the Holocaust occurred, it is reasonable to bar him from speaking on campus.
In contrast to debate’s requirement for civility, debate’s requirement for safety is much more absolute. If the speaker is known to incite violence or make direct threats, he should not be allowed to speak. By “inciting violence,” I am not referring to a person whose events are characterized by violence. If the speaker has not directly encouraged violence against people, he is not to blame if others become violent when he speaks, whether the violent people agree with him or if they disagree with him. In this case, I am referring to direct calls to violence or direct encouragement of violence. For instance, consider again the case of the woman who hates vests. If she speaks about the harms of accepting the wearing of vests in society, and her supporters separately attack the school’s elite vest club and set fire to all of their vests, she is not to blame, even if her words led to the burning taking place. But if she called for the raid, she would be responsible for the act of violence, even if she only did so subtly. For instance, if she said, “I hear there is a club of vest wearers here. It would be great if they got burned somehow,” she would likely be responsible. It is also important that “necessary violence” if you will is just as unacceptable as “unnecessary violence.” Even if the act of violence, threat of violence, or instigation of violence is necessary to make one’s argument, it cannot be accepted because open debate cannot survive where it exists. People who engage in this kind of action have no place in academia.
But if the issue that is taken with the speaker is rooted in their beliefs, is it acceptable for the university to deplatform the speaker? I don’t think so. I will consider two possible arguments for not allowing the speaker to speak on campus based on their beliefs alone: the argument from the limits of civility and the consequentialist argument. These arguments are not mutually exclusive, but they represent two ways of looking at speech.
As explained earlier, civility is very important to debate. When using this idea earlier, I considered good debate to be the goal, and I rejected unnecessary incivilities because I found them to be destructive to this goal. However, the argument from the limits of civility will take a more nuanced view of what the goal is. I will base these ideas off of Cheshire Calhoun’s essay “The Virtue of Civility,” in which she creates an account of civility as a virtue which must be held in balance with other kinds of virtues. I do not mean to claim that Calhoun would make or agree with the argument from the limits of civility, but I will use a derivative of her model to consider the matter.
Calhoun puts value in being civil with ideas one disagrees with and acknowledges that this is an important part of a healthy society, but she does not believe that the goal is always open debate. She creates an outline for what she calls “the limits of civility.” She holds that while we should be willing to hold civil debate and discussion with those with whom we vehemently disagree, there are limits to what we should be expected to respond to in a civil manner. She finds that these limits are rooted in the standards of society. She says that even if a view is very wrong, it should still be responded to civilly if there is no public consensus on the matter—this kind of civil discussion is necessary to show that the very wrong view is very wrong—but she claims that this is not the case if the view is already widely discredited and there is a public consensus that the view is very wrong. In this case, she claims that a civil response is not owed.
For the sake of this particular argument, I will not take a civil response to necessarily include a handshake, a smile, and a warm welcome. Instead, I will create a minimalist account for a civil response consisting of respecting one another’s right to speak and be heard, a willingness to consider and respect the ideas of one another, and not resorting to destructive incivilities, such as insults. While I acknowledge that the mere act of showing a cold shoulder may be uncivil, I am not considering rejecting it to be a part of the necessary civil response because it does not represent a grave hindrance to successful debate. This may not be what Calhoun considers a civil response, but I will use this model for the argument from the limits of civility. I will also make a connection which Calhoun does not directly make: that the reason a civil response is not owed in this kind of case is that presenting the arguments constitutes an incivility in itself because it makes no new points and is harmful or non-inclusive to a set of people. This would be a necessary incivility because it is necessary to argue for the view.
From these ideas, the argument from the limits of civility would go something like this: 1. Uncivil actions are not owed civil responses. 2. Making arguments which are clearly false, socially unacceptable with an overwhelming consensus that the ideas are incorrect, consist of arguments which have been discredited, and are exclusionary, dismissing of fact, or harmful constitutes a form of incivility. 3. Making these kinds of arguments is not owed a civil response. 4. It is very clear that the Holocaust happened. 5. There is a huge consensus that the Holocaust happened. 6. The arguments of the speaker have been fully discredited. 7. The speaker’s views are dismissing of fact and possibly harmful to various groups. 8. Therefore, the speaker is not owed a civil response from the university, meaning that it is acceptable to not allow him to speak.
This argument may seem sound, but there are historical examples which reveal its problems. Consider the case of the imprisonment of Galileo Galilei. Galileo claimed that the Sun was the center of the universe, rather than the Earth. Geocentrism was the dominant philosophy at the time. Modern understanding shows that neither view is absolutely correct, but Galileo was closer to the truth than his contemporaries. At the time, it seemed very clear that the Earth was the center of the universe, there was a huge consensus that the Earth was the center of the Universe, so Galileo’s arguments seemed to have been discredited. Galileo’s views were seen as deeply harmful. Was Galileo owed a civil response? The church did not seem to think so. They showed him extreme incivility, imprisoning him for life for his views. I do not mean to imply that those who employ the argument from the bounds of civility in my scenario wish to imprison the speaker, nor that the argument from the bounds of civility necessitates that imprisonment is an appropriate uncivil response when no civil response is owed. Consider that the argument from the bounds of civility would certainly allow all kinds of other incivilities against Galileo, including ones which would silence him, which we would consider to be very bad in retrospect. I only mean to point out that it can be very bad to show destructive incivility to people who argue for widely discredited views one disagrees with.
The problem with the argument is twofold. First, Premise 2 refers to necessary incivilities. As I mentioned before, it is questionable whether necessary incivilities are incivilities at all. This idea is difficult to demonstrate, and I will not attempt to do so here, but the same kind of issue can be shown without making this claim. If, in the appropriate space of debate, someone commits only the absolutely necessary incivilities, they are trying very hard to be civil. The purpose of civility in debate is to serve the free sharing of ideas toward the finding of the truth. It would be overstepping the purpose of civility in a debate to prioritize civility over sharing one’s true ideas. By avoiding unnecessary incivility, this person is showing that she values civility, but not above the free sharing of ideas, which is what debate is for. The second issue is that it is impossible to know with absolute certainty that a view is truly incorrect even if the common thought of the time is entirely oriented against it.
I also don’t mean to say that there are no bounds of civility whatsoever. If someone acts with unnecessary incivility to someone else, they are not owed a civil response, obviously, but there are also bounds to civility regarding speech. I think that a good model of the bounds of civility should account for setting. People are not obligated to live in constant debate. If the vest-hating woman approaches someone wearing a vest in a supermarket and claims that vests are just worthless shirts because they don’t have sleeves, the vest-wearer is under no obligation to explain that the sole useful feature of the shirt is not the sleeves and that there is value to covering the torso without covering the arms, even if the woman explains her views very nicely. It would be acceptable for the vest wearer to respond with a degree of incivility. Few would take issue if he told her to go away. At the dinner table, there are also bounds of civility. If the vest-hating woman spots her nephew taking up vest-wearing, it may not be appropriate for him to say, “Go away,” but it would be appropriate for he and the rest of the family to intentionally ignore her descriptions of the dangers of vests. But we must be able to have these conversations somewhere. Academia strives to be that place of open debate. If this woman cannot express her opinions in an academic environment or other safe space for debate and discussion which she was invited to, she is being silenced everywhere.
The consequentialist argument is simpler. In the case of the speaker, it would point out the following: 1. The purpose of debate is to collectively move toward the truth. 2. A claim must be new or based in fact or good philosophical thought to be useful in moving toward the truth. 3. The speaker is almost certainly not making any new claims or claims based in fact or good philosophical thought. 4. In all likelihood, letting the speaker speak will not be useful in moving toward the truth, the purpose of having debate to begin with. 5. It is likely that letting the speaker on campus could cause harm, such as violence or discrimination. 6. Letting the speaker speak would probably have a net negative result. 7. It is reasonable to not allow him to speak.
Quite a lot of this is reasonable. The first six points could be useful in deciding whether inviting someone to speak is useful or a good idea. I think that it is a problem, however, for universities to use this kind of logic to restrict speech. Point 7, the conclusion, does not follow. Though it may be likely that allowing the speaker to speak is worthless at best, this kind of evaluation does not warrant action form a controlling force such as the university. Upholding free speech does not mean only protecting speech one thinks is useful, but protecting speech which might not be. If we accept this argument, an authority could consider any sort of speech to be useless and ultimately harmful because the argument does not work with objective certainty; it works in probabilities. For these reasons, it does not seem acceptable to ban the speaker on these grounds.
What does this mean for the university hosting the speaker? Assuming that he is not a danger nor unacceptably unnecessarily uncivil, is there anything a university can do? First, it is not totally inappropriate for the university to have an opinion—particularly on matters with the degree of certainty that comes with stating that the Holocaust did in fact occur. Also, the university does not have to pretend they like the speaker. This is the distinction I was referring to when I gave a minimalist account of a civil response. While there should be civil acceptance, there need not be other kinds of acceptance. Beyond direct response, the university can take action to ensure that a safe and civil environment is maintained by monitoring the event and creating spaces for protest. The speech of the speaker should not come at the expense of the speech of his opponents. Students can protest, or if they find the speaker to be worthless, completely ignore him. He isn’t saying anything meaningful, so why give him attention? It is the responsibility of academia to be a space of debate and discussion, even of views which are objectionable. By providing a space for these debates, we can remind ourselves of the reasons we do not accept such ideas—because they are rooted in misinformation and bad arguments—rather than succumbing to dogmatic rejections of objectionable views.
No comments:
Post a Comment